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COLLOQUY
Legislative Self-Constraint: A Reply
to Professor Kahn
By WILLIAM D. POPKIN*

Introduction
The Gramm-Rudman Act' constrained Congress' ability to adopt

future appropriations legislation.2 The constraint took the form of an
automatic presidential sequester order reducing appropriations to meet
budget deficit targets. The reduction was based on a comparison of appropriations passed by Congress with deficit estimates made by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office,

and submitted for review by the Comptroller General. While some appropriations were exempt from the sequester order,3 and the reductions
were not uniform for military and nonmilitary spending, the reductions
generally followed a pro-rata scheme. Furthermore, Congress can exempt a future appropriation from the sequester order. But that would

require an explicit exemption in the appropriation bill.4
Legal objections to Gramm-Rudman fell primarily into two categories: (1) because of the role played by the OMB, it delegated too much
budgetary authority to the executive branch to control appropriations;
and (2) it permitted the Comptroller General, an agent of the Legisla* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
1. Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1986) [hereinafter Gramm-Rudman].
2. Id. at § 252(a)(3).
3. See, e.g., id. at § 255 (social security, food stamps, and AFDC).
4. There have been a number of exemptions. See, e.g., Sequestration-VA Home Loan
Guarantee, Pub. L. No. 99-255, 100 Stat. 39 (1986); Food Security Improvements Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-260, § 10(2), 100 Stat. 52 (1986); Sequestration of VA Loan Guarantee Commitments, Pub. L. No. 99-322, 100 Stat. 494 (1986); Panama Canal Commission Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-368, § 6, 100 Stat. 776 (1986); Territories and
Insular Possessions, Pub. L. No. 99-396, § 19(b), 100 Stat. 844 (1986); see also 44 CONG. Q.
2881 (1986) (reporting exemptions from Gramm-Rudman adopted by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(pamphlet 10)).
[205]
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ture, to exercise executive power. The second ground provided the basis
for the Supreme Court's decision striking down the provision for an automatic sequester order.5 The Court held that vesting executive decisionmaking in the Comptroller General, who was subject to removal by
Congress by joint resolution, impermissibly vested executive power in an
agent of the Legislature. Either the Legislature must delegate rulemaking authority to the Executive or it must exercise policymaking authority
6
itself.
The most innovative feature of Gramm-Rudman was its effort to
constrain future legislation. The legality of this provision has attracted
little public attention, but was the subject of academic commentary in a
recent article by Professor Paul Kahn in the HastingsConstitutionalLaw
Quarterly.7 Professor Kahn notes that Gramm-Rudman both thwarts
and distorts future legislative policymaking. It thwarts the Legislature
by forcing the majority favoring an appropriation to muster a majority to
repeal Gramm-Rudman or obtain an exemption from its provisions. It
distorts policymaking by encouraging advocates of appropriations to inflate their proposals, not just as part of the normal bargaining process,
but in anticipation of an across the board sequester order.8
Professor Kahn argues that these features of Gramm-Rudman make
it constitutionally defective for two reasons. First, only hierarchically
superior authority can bind or significantly constrain the future rulemaking power of another institution.9 The Constitution can bind the Legislature and the Legislature can bind executive agencies, but these
institutions cannot bind themselves. Part I of this Article criticizes the
hierarchy thesis.
Second, Professor Kahn argues that the Legislature is special. As
the means by which popular sovereignty is implemented, its future lawmaking power should not be constrained.1 ° This argument asserts that
constraining popular sovereignty is constitutionally objectionable by undermining the ability of democratic institutions to adapt to change."
Part II discusses this issue.
5. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
6. Justices Stevens and Marshall concurred on the ground that Gramm-Rudman vested
policymaking authority in a person who operated as an arm of Congress. Id. at 3194 (Stevens,
J., concurring). They did not rely on the fact that the Comptroller General could be removed
by joint resolution or that the authority exercised was executive. Id.
7. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacityof Congress to Control the Future, 13 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185 (1986).
8. Id. at 204-11.
9. Id. at 187, 211-28.
10. Id. at 207-11, 231.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 66-8 1.

Winter 19871

LEGISLATIVE SELF-CONSTRAINT

Opposition to legislative self-constraint strikes a resonant chord

with the modem spirit of opposition to stale legislation. The dead hand
of prior statutes has proven hard to lift, and recent legislation, such as
sunsetting provisions and short-term authorization statutes, 12 respond to
this criticism. But suppose Congress decides that it mistrusts the future?
Are efforts to constrain future legislation, though controversial, also
unconstitutional?
The importance of these issues survives the unconstitutionality of
Gramm-Rudman's automatic sequestration procedure for several reasons. First, the sequestration procedure might be revived by Congress,
with the authority given solely to the executive branch to determine
when the trigger operates.13 Second, other efforts to constrain the content of future statutes might be attempted. For example, the GrammRudman mechanism might be used to maintain spending levels rather
than lower them. A group of four welfare programs, such as AFDC,
Medicaid, Food Stamps, and School Lunches, might be lumped together
in a package, totaling $40 billion, each receiving $10 billion. Legislation
might provide that reduction of one program would result in an across
the board pro-rata increase of all four programs to maintain the total $40
billion expenditure. In this way, efforts to reduce welfare spending, by
picking on the less popular AFDC program, would be defeated.
Third, Congress might experiment with tying future legislation reducing spending in one area to an adverse political impact in another
area. This could cost advocates of spending reduction the votes needed
to make the reduction. For example, an environmental statute might
provide funds for national parks, balanced by a presidential impoundment power over funds for pollution control. The law might further specify that future reduction of funds for national parks would automatically
repeal the President's impoundment power, thus balancing the lower
spending on parks with higher spending on pollution control. A future
majority favoring lower park spending might therefore disintegrate, because some of them oppose repealing the impoundment power. The majority favoring reduction could, of course, vote for uncoupling the park
spending reduction from the repeal of presidential impoundment power,
just as an advocate of an appropriation under Gramm-Rudman could
vote to repeal the Gramm-Rudman limits. However, some of the advo12. For a proposal that courts be able to declare statutes obsolete, see G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982).

13. President Reagan has proposed a thorough review of the budget process, see N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 3, which could include revival of a proposal to vest complete
control over the deficit estimation process in the executive branch. See, e.g., H.R. 5254, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H4923 (daily ed. July 24, 1986).
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cates of park spending reduction, apart from those who want to maintain
the impoundment power, might be opposed to presidential impoundment
on principle and be unwilling to vote to preserve that power. Thus, the
legislation favoring park spending contains a built-in political hurdle to
spending reduction, over and above that required to gather a majority in
support of reduction.
This arrangement is formally different from Gramm-Rudman in
that a future law lowering park spending is not automatically inoperative
unless a prior law is repealed, but the effect is similar in that it forces a
political alliance not otherwise required if future legislation is to pass. If
the Gramm-Rudman mechanism is suspect, so are arrangements which
tie future spending reductions in one area to an adverse political impact
14
in another area.

The general question of legislative self-constraint is also important
for two other reasons. First, Kahn's position is an extreme example of
legal positivism, which requires an exercise of legal authority to be specifically authorized by a superior power. If self-constraining rules are possible without tracing their authority to a superior source, that would
provide a counter-example to this version of legal positivism. Second,
the issue of legislative self-constraint is very important in Great Britain,
where parliamentary sovereignty is challenged by any effort to adopt a
law limiting future legislation. The capacity of Parliament to adopt a Bill
of Rights and to adhere to the statute joining the European Economic
Community depends on the entrenchment of prior statutes from later
change.15
14. An example of a tying arrangement appears in the Middle Income Student Assistant
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, § 2(d), 92 Stat. 2402 (1978), which states that funding for one program will be at a certain level only if funding for other programs, such as work-study, is
provided at a certain level. The point is to force opponents of the other programs, who are
advocates of the first program, to vote sufficient funds for the other programs. This statute
differs from the example in the text because an appropriation is contingent on future spending.
In the text, the repeal of spending for national parks triggers spending for pollution control, by
repealing presidential impoundment power. In both instances, however, opponents of a spending program must think twice about the effect of not appropriating money on an existing
statute, in one case because it will reduce spending for a pet project and in the other case
because it will increase other spending by removing the President's impoundment power.
15. See H. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 24-40 (1980); Winterton, The
British Grundnorm: ParliamentarySupremacy Re-Examined, 92 LAW Q. REv. 591 (1976);
Allan, ParliamentarySovereignty: Lord Denning'sDexterous Revolution, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 22 (1983).
Whatever the theoretical position, British courts seem to treat the statute governing membership in the European Economic Community as entrenched to the extent that express rejection of the prior law is required before the court will give effect to the later law. See L.
COLLIN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

21-33 (1984).
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This Article will therefore criticize the hierarchy thesis in general, as
well as the view that principles of popular sovereignty are incompatible

with all instances of significant legislative self-constraint. It argues that
specific examples of legislative self-constraint should not be abstracted

from an analysis of their substantive impact, as Professor Kahn's legal
positivist approach would require. The Legislature's experiment with
controlling its future lawmaking power should not be prematurely stifled
by condemning all self-constraining statutes.

I.

Hierarchy

Rules adopted by a hierarchically superior institution can constrain

an inferior rulemaker. 16 That is not disputed. Professor Kahn argues
further that hierarchical superiority is not only sufficient but is also necessary to constrain an institution's future rulemaking authority. 7 To
support his argument, he discusses cases preventing executive agencies

from disregarding their own rules, which in effect construe the prior
agency rules as self-constraining. Professor Kahn traces the agency's authority to adopt self-constraining rules to a grant of power from a supe16. State constitutions frequently specify the process by which statutes must be passed.
1A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1-79 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972). The United

States Constitution contains examples of self-constraining rules consciously adopted by a superior authority, such as the Amendment Clause and the rule that the Constitution cannot be
amended to take away the right of each state to two senators. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
Identifying the superior authority always presents a problem because the question of its
source of authority arises. In the case of the Constitution, Madison had no trouble answering
that its source was the "people." He provided this answer in response to a question concerning
how constitutional change could originate from a convention called by Congress under the
Articles of Confederation to amend those Articles and how such change could limit the existing power of the states without their consent. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 314 (M. Farrand ed. 1937); THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 255 (J. Madison) (Modern
Library ed. 1971); id. No. 22, at 140-41 (A. Hamilton) (Articles of Confederation ratified by
legislatures, not people).
Once the source of superior authority is identified, the next question is whether that
source persists or whether its historical act of creation is self-limiting. Specifically, do the
"people" retain a latent Constitution-creating authority, other than as provided for by the
Constitution, and, if so, by what form would that authority be exercised? The ability of a
sovereign to restrain itself has raised difficult theological questions, and similar questions have
been raised concerning legal sovereigns. While Professor H.L.A. Hart finds nothing unintelligible in the notion of a self-constraining sovereign, the sovereign does not have to withdraw.
H. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 177 (1983). See also Gatewood v.
Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966).
17. Kahn, supra note 7, at 211-31.
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rior institution, the Legislature. The cases he cites,1 8 as he
acknowledges," are concerned with serious harms to individuals, such as
deportation and loss of employment on loyalty grounds. Forcing an
agency to be bound by its own rules might therefore be an example of
judicial rejection of unprincipled government harm to individuals, which
is objectionable on its own terms, apart from whether self-constraining
rules were authorized by a hierarchically superior authority.
The "individual harm" explanation founders, in Professor Kahn's
view, because these cases do not involve the denial of a constitutional,
statutory, or common-law right by the agency which refused to adhere to
its own rules-apart from whatever rights accrue from the mere fact that
existing rules were violated.20 Moreover, in United States v. Nixon,2" the
Court held that an executive official's rules could not be disregarded,
even though no question of individual harm was involved. The case involved an intrabranch dispute between the President, who claimed executive privilege, and the Special Prosecutor, who claimed that previously
adopted rules, promulgated by the Attorney General and granting him
authority to investigate the Watergate scandal, prevented the executive
privilege claim. The weaknesses of the individual harm explanation for
why self-constraining rules are valid suggest to Professor Kahn that the
source of these rules lies in a grant of power from a superior legislative
authority.2 2
Professor Kahn's argument rests on two questionable assumptions.
The first is that there must be constitutional, statutory, or common-law
rights which exist independent of the disregarded rule. Recent Supreme
Court pronouncements seem to favor Professor Kahn's approach, tying
procedural safeguards to preexisting substantive rights,2 3 but other cases,
including those upholding self-constraining rules, are consistent with the
view that government inflicted harm must always pass a procedural test.
If the harm is serious enough and the procedure arbitrary enough, and
no compelling justification for the agency's behavior in disregarding its
18. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (discharge of federal employee as security
risk); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (discharge of federal employee for suspect loyalty);
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (deportation).
Cases which constrain legislative committees to follow their own rules can be similarly
explained. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (contempt of Congress conviction);
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949) (perjury conviction).
19. Kahn supra note 7, at 214-15 n.98. See also id. at 228 n.158.
20. Id. at 212.
21. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
22. Kahn, supra note 7, at 213-16.
23. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-12 (1978).
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own rules exists, rights are violated by abandoning institutional self-constraint, even if imposing the harm does not itself violate an independent
right.
Admittedly, the United States v. Nixon case does not fit into the
individual harm framework, because the dispute was defined as an institutional clash within the executive branch, not as a conflict between a
harmed individual and the government. But that does not vindicate the
hierarchy thesis. The harm threatened in United States v. Nixon was serious, even if not directed to an individual. If the Nixon tapes were not
turned over to the Special Prosecutor, the Watergate affair threatened to
undermine the integrity of the political process, by a process which itself
appeared to be a politically ad hoc decision to reject existing rules. Thus,
the need to follow existing government rules was of the utmost
importance.
Another case involving former President Nixon supports the argument that threatened harm, though not to an individual, was both serious
and legally relevant. In Nixon v. Administratorof General Services Administration, 4 the Court considered a statute requiring Nixon to turn
over his papers to the government.25 The special circumstances of
Watergate prevented the statute from violating the Bill of Attainder
Clause. 26 These circumstances provided a compelling governmental interest justifying the statute's demand for Nixon's papers, and overcoming
charges that the statute was merely an effort to punish a fallen political
figure. Similarly, in United States v. Nixon, the harm to the body politic,
like individual harm, was so serious that prior rules constraining future
action could be countenanced.
Further, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Edelman v. Jordan2 7 supports the analogy between institutional and individual harms. In that
case, the Court decided that a federal statute did not require the state to
waive its immunity from damage suits when it accepted federal funds for
an Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled 8 program. Justice Rehnquist
invoked the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to support the decision. 9 Usually that doctrine is sensitive to claims that individual rights
24. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
25. Presidential Recordings and Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
See 433 U.S. at 429.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
27. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
28. ILL. REV. STAT., ILL. PUB. AID C., ch. 23, S% 3-1 to 3-12 (1973).

29. 415 U.S. at 671-74 (it is unconstitutional to condition the receipt of federal benefits
upon the beneficiary's waiver of a constitutional right).
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are being compromised by imposing conditions on their exercise.3 0 Justice Rehnquist argued that this doctrine was applicable to states' rights, 3
an institutional rather than an individual concern, and that the statute
should be interpreted to avoid having such an adverse impact on states.
Judicial concern for the Special Prosecutor's role in obtaining the Nixon
tapes, like Justice Rehnquist's concern for states' rights, rests on institutional values, which are no less important than preventing individual
harm from arbitrary agency action.
The second questionable assumption on which Professor Kahn's hierarchy thesis rests is that the hierarchically superior Legislature has created the self-constraining rule adopted by the inferior agency by
delegating authority to the agency.32 Professor Kahn states: "Congress
can create second-order rules that constrain the exercise of executive authority."3 3 But the notion that the grant of rulemaking power to an inferior institution creates the rules that are then adopted is pure fiction.34
The grant of rulemaking authority is not specifically concerned with
whether adopted rules can be revoked. All we can say with any degree of
certainty is that adoption of a self-constraining rule lies within the broad
scope of delegated authority. However, permission to adopt a rule does
not tar the hierarchically superior authority-granting institution with
creation of the adopted rule by an inferior agency. The fiction that treats
the superior institution as the creator of rules adopted by an inferior institution may seem required by democratic principles. Democracy, however, is adequately served by the existence of a general grant of legislative
authority to an agency, confidence that the adopted rule is not outside
the limits of that grant, and the ability to reverse the rule if it is objectionable. Positing a closer link between superior and inferior institutions
is, in fact, damaging to democratic principles. Democracy is enhanced
by accountability,36 which is served by recognizing that the inferior
30. See generally R. O'NEILL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY (1970).
31. 415 U.S. at 673.
32. Kahn, supra note 7, at 215.
33. Id. "Second-order rules" is Kahn's term for a rule about how future rules are made.
Id. at 195.
34. It is even more fanciful to suggest that congressional silence ratifies the agency rule.
Id. at 215 n.98.
35. Suggesting that Congress had any intention at all about permitting self-constraint is
like suggesting that it considered the question of executive impoundment. Neither is likely.
See Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Congress is not likely to consider impoundment of funds when it creates a program).
36. One of the arguments against the legislative veto was that it diffused responsibility to
such an extent that the agency would not act responsibly in adopting a regulation subject to
veto. See Consumers Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425,
475 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
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rulemaker is the real source of the decision.
In United States v. Caceres,37 the Supreme Court, while allowing an
agency to break its own rules, did not apply the hierarchy thesis. Instead
it analyzed the issue in terms of the harm to the individual and the threat
of arbitrary agency action if the agency did not follow its own rules. The
case concerned an Internal Revenue Service Manual which set forth procedures to authorize a wiretap,3 8 and which IRS agents failed to follow.
An individual objected to the admission of evidence obtained in violation
of these rules. The Court did not dismiss the claims on the ground that
the individual had no constitutional, statutory, or common-law right to
the protections contained in the Manual. Instead, the Court looked at
the way the IRS operated and concluded that the mistake had been made
in good faith, 9 and that individual interests would be better served by
allowing the Agency, in certain instances, to break its rules.' If the
Court were confronted with a different agency, whose good faith was in
doubt, or with a more significant harm, it might require an agency to
follow its own rules.
Professor Kahn also argues that the hierarchy thesis is vindicated by
the way judges approach judicial self-constraint.4 1 He observes that
courts cannot bind themselves if they are at the same level of authority.
Only a superior court binds an inferior court. Freedom from self-binding
decisions, however, is not the proper analogy to Gramm-Rudman. No
one claims that the'Legislature can bind itself in the sense of not being
able to repeal laws. Gramm-Rudman only constrains the Legislature's
future rulemaking authority-but so do courts. Courts constrain themselves by their self-imposed reluctance to adopt prospective decisions.
The threat of retroactive application of decisions severely constrains future judgments. That is one of the reasons why Justice Black objected to
prospective decisions.4 2 Of course, the court can still adopt a future decision prospectively, disregarding the bias for retroactivity, just as Congress can adopt appropriations and exempt them from Gramm-Rudman.
However, the future judicial decision is constrained by the bias for retroactivity, which is a factor operating in addition to whatever the merits of
the case would indicate.
Professor Kahn suggests that the courts' greater adherence to stare
37. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
38. Id. at 744, 749-50.
39. Id. at 752, 757.
40. Id. at 756 (mandating strict adherence might discourage an agency's adoption of
rules, which in most instances would be followed).
41. Kahn, supra note 7, at 216-19.
42. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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decisis when decisions involve statutory interpretation 3 supports the hierarchy thesis, on the ground that judicial self-restraint arises from delegated sovereign authority, inferred from the fact that the Legislature can
reverse the court's decision.' There are two problems with this argument. First, it may no longer be true. There are signs that special weight
will no longer be accorded to stare decisis in statutory interpretation
cases. 4 5 Second, the argument for this judicial approach cannot rely on a
grant of authority from a superior legislative source. The Legislature's
ability to veto a judicial decision does not establish that judicial authority
to act with self-restraint originated from the hierarchically superior legislative authority. A later veto is no more a specific source of authority
than is a broad initial grant of rulemaking power. The reasons why stare
decisis might have greater weight in statutory interpretation cases probably include the belief that reliance interests are more severely affected,4 6
that the Legislature exercises greater supervision over such decisions,
and that the meaning of a statute is an historical fact which cannot be
overruled.4 7 All these reasons seem questionable, originating in an antiquated view of the role of statutes in our legal system. They are nonetheless the more likely explanations for according stare decisis special
weight in statutory interpretation cases, rather than the belief that selfconstraining interpretations are authorized by a hierarchically superior
Legislature.
The basic question in deciding whether legislative self-constraint is
constitutionally permissible should therefore be not whether a self-constraining rule is authorized by a hierarchically superior authority, but
whether legislative self-constraint in particular should be constitutionally
permitted. This question requires us to look specifically at the nature of
legislation in our political system.
43. See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 540 (1948);
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904, 1930 (1986).
44. Kahn, supra note 7, at 218 n.113.
45. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Lodge 76,
Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976);
Windust v. Department of Labor & Indust., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958). But cf
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (paying homage to the special role of
stare decisis in statutory construction and declining to overrule a prior case).
46. Note, The Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions,

47 HARV. L. REv. 1403, 1407 n.27 (1934).
47. See Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 157 N.W.2d 648, 651, 38 Wis. 2d 626,
634 (1968); see also Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513, 516, 47 Wis. 2d 120, 128
(1970).
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II.

Are Legislatures Special?

Perhaps the Legislature should not be permitted to constrain itself
because it is the institution charged with implementing popular sovereignty, which should be "inalienable and complete." 4 As Professor
Kahn acknowledges, there are two problems with this argument. First,
there are self-constraining laws now in effect which are clearly constitutional and which cannot easily be distinguished from Gramm-Rudman.
Second, the argument against legislative self-constraint rests on substantive policies about how responsive to change the Legislature should be,
and whether those policies must have constitutional significance. This
Article argues that the distinctions between laws by which the Legislature constrains itself, in the manner of Gramm-Rudman and other
clearly constitutional legislative action which constrains future legislation, do not provide a sufficient basis for drawing constitutional lines.
This Article then suggests that the policy reasons against legislative selfconstraint, while strong, are not powerful enough to invalidate all such
statutes.
A.

Existing Self-Constraining Legislation

Statutes frequently constrain, sometimes severely, future legislation.
Statutes create as well as reflect interest groups, which then cluster
around the statute to protect the status quo. These constraints are generally a by-product of the legislation. Their formal operation is different
from a statute like Gramm-Rudman, which directly constrains the content of future laws. However, a formal difference is not necessarily a constitutionally significant difference. In both situations the future
Legislature is constrained, not bound, by a prior law, and sufficient political will can overcome the effect of either type of prior legislation. The
significant influence of past statutes which constrain their own repeal is
recognized by the Constitution, which forbids appropriations to raise and
support armies for more than two years. 49
The distinction between laws which formally constrain the content
of future legislation and laws which create powerful political interests
becomes especially suspect when the political influence created by the
statute operates at a level superior to lawmaking. Legislatures have considerable, though not unlimited, power to gerrymander electoral dis52
5
tricts,5" control the electoral process, " and regulate political financing,
48. Kahn, supra note 7, at 231.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12.
50. Davis v. Beandemer, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (1986). The Legislature's use of multimember
districts is also practically free ofjudicial control, absent discrimination on grounds of race or

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

r'Vol. 14:205

all of which directly influence the composition of later Legislatures, and
therefore of later legislation.
Some statutes have a more formal effect on how laws are made. One
type, which Professor Kahn discusses, specifies that a future statute will
not repeal a prior law unless it does so "expressly." 5 3 Professor Kahn
argues that these statutes only impose "clear statement" requirements.5 4
They do not directly constrain the content of future laws, but only re-

solve ambiguities in future statutes.55 The reference to "ambiguity"
makes the constraining effect of the prior law sound more innocent than
it is. The point of a clear statement requirement, like the requirement of
reasonable doubt to convict, is to make it harder to achieve a substantive
result.56 A court confronted with the prior law does not first determine
whether there is an ambiguity in the later statute, and then call on the
clear statement mandate of the prior law to resolve doubts. The prior

statute helps determine whether the ambiguity exists in the first instance.
Indeed, the purpose and effect of a clear statement requirement is to
influence the substantive content of future statutes. It is likely to do so in
two ways. First, clarity may spark opposition that would otherwise be
unaware of the import of the future statute. Second, those insisting on
other "suspect classification." See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) (distinguishing court
versus legislative adoption of multimember districts).
51. Compare Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (held constitutional a Georgia law
requiring candidates for local election to win the primary or file a petition signed by a minimum of five percent of the eligible voters), with Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (held
unconstitutional an Ohio law making third party candidates on the ballet a virtual
impossibility).
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. Kahn, supra note 7, at 201 n.59 (Administrative Procedure Act). See also Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1302, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws

(pamphlet 9A) ("any change in future legislation applicable to private activity bonds shall
apply to section 501(c)(3) bonds only if expressly provided in such legislation").
Sometimes clear statement rules are used to maintain relative spending priorities in an
authorization statute, if the appropriations legislation specifies a different priority. See Act of
Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-516, § 19, 94 Stat. 3009 (1980), dealing with the National Science Foundation. It provides that, if total appropriations for a group of programs falls short of
the total authorized for the group, the authorizations for each program will be reduced pro
rata, unless the later appropriations statute expressly provides otherwise. For example, if two
$50 programs are authorized, and only $50 is appropriated for one of them, the authorization
level for each program is reduced to $25, unless the statute appropriating $50 for one program
expressly specifies to the contrary.
54. Kahn, supra note 7, at 202.
55. Id. at 203 (the APA "addresses situations of real ambiguity").
56. This feature of a clear statement rule would be objected to by Professor Dickerson,
who insists that the effect of an interpretive rule be limited to cases in which they are genuinely
part of the context of a later statute, and to cases in which all other criteria for determining
meaning are in equipoise. R. DICKERSON, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 270-76 (1975). They should not, in his view, operate as rules of law.
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the clear statement must reveal the intensity of their preferences and this

may encourage other legislators to bargain for their pet legislative
projects in exchange for supporting a clear statement repealing prior law.
Clarity is therefore likely to produce opposition that makes future legislation more difficult, which is what Gramm-Rudman also achieves.
The desirability of a clear statement rule in bringing legislative pref-

erences into the open might count as an argument in their favor. It is
not, however, an argument that Professor Kahn can make, because it
requires distinctions among self-constraining rules, based on nonformal

criteria. The same point can be made about Professor Kahn's argument
justifying statutes which permit express repeal only by referring explicitly
to the repealed statute.5 7 He justifies this provision in a statute delegat58
ing to the President extraordinary powers during a national emergency,
as essential to assure clear understanding of presidential authority during
times of crisis. This reason for supporting a clear statement requirement
is powerful but irrelevant, if only formal nonsubstantive criteria can jus-

tify self-constraining legislation.
Professor Kahn also argues that the fact that legislatures cannot
bind themselves to previously adopted procedures59 provides further evi-

dence that self-constraining laws are suspect. 60 However, legislative procedures, though not binding, still have a significant constraining effect,

because they can be disregarded only by flexing the political muscle-not
only to pass the desired legislation, but also to disregard the procedural
rule. The constraining effect of nonbinding legislative procedures sup-

ports rather than rejects legislative self-constraint. Procedural rules vary
in their effectiveness in constraining adoption of future statutes. The fili57. Kahn, supra note 7, at 203-04.
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (1982).
59. Kahn, supra note 7, at 225. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). Legislatures can also adopt statutes in violation of their own procedural rules. Goodwin v. State Bd.
of Admin., 212 Ala. 453, 455, 102 So. 718, 719 (1925). Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)
(statute enrolled and signed by the President with different language from that passed by the
Legislature is law as provided in enrolled form).
The outer boundaries of the rule that procedures for passing statutes can be violated was
reached in State v. Savings Bank of New London, 79 Conn. 141, 152-53, 64 A. 5, 9-10 (1906),
where a bill had accidentally been sent to the Governor for signature when it had not passed
the legislature. No law resulted. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (vote sufficient to expel from the House of Representatives would not have that effect when the exclusion, not expulsion, procedure had been followed by the House and the substantive exclusion
criteria were not met).
60. Kahn, supra note 7, at 225-28.
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buster rule in the Senate61 has a severe constraining effect. Only revision
of the underlying rules themselves at the beginning of each Congress can
remove this obstacle. Other rules are adhered to less diligently. Appropriations bills in the Senate cannot include nongermane substantive legislation,6 2 but votes on this issue tend to reflect substantive preferences for
the underlying legislation, not adherence to the spirit of the procedural
rule.63 In other situations points of order raised against the violation of
legislative procedures will result in cajoling and bargaining, with the legislators raising the point of order to get them to withdraw their objections, a process which constrains the adoption of statutes violating the
procedural rules. 4 Procedural objections are even more effective towards the end of a legislative session, when it is difficult to find time to
marshal legislative votes to overcome the objections.
In contrast to Gramm-Rudman, the self-constraining force of procedural rules is not focused on the substantive content of specific later legislation. For this reason, the constraining effect of procedural rules might
be considered different from statutes with a more focused substantive impact. But many procedural rules clearly have, and are meant to have, a
substantive bias. They are intended to slow down the legislative process,
so as to protect minority political interests and to prevent special interests from prevailing.6" Procedural rules are meant to have substantive
impact, just like statutes constraining substantive content.
In summary, the formal distinction between constraining the content of future laws, binding the Legislature to clear statement requirements, and constraining (but not binding) the Legislature by adopting
procedures, does not explain why some laws which constrain future legislation are constitutional and others are not. All such statutes try to influence the substantive content of future legislation, whatever the formal
61.

SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, STANDING RULES OF THE SEN-

ATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, Rule XX, cl. 2 (1984) [hereinafter STANDING
RULES].

62. Id. at Rule XVI, cl. 4.

63. See Fisher, The Authorization-AppropriationProcess in Congress: FormalRules and
Informal Practices,29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 91-93, 104 (1979); see generally A. SCHICK, LEGISLATION, APPROPRIATIONS, AND BUDGETS:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPENDING DECISION-

MAKING IN CONGRESS (May 1984) (copy on file at the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly
offices).
64. Among the procedural rules to which a Senator might appeal to thwart a legislative
majority are the requirement that there be three readings of a bill, see STANDING RULES, supra
note 61, at Rule XIV, cl. 2, and that conference agreements between the House and Senate not
exceed the scope of the bills on which the Houses disagree, id. at Rule XXVIII, cl. 2.
65. The prevention of special interest legislation is a major reason for state constitutional
rules about the form of legislation. See Ruud, No Law Shall EmbraceMore Than One Subject,
42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1958).
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distinction, and formal categories will therefore not resolve the issue.
Only an analysis of the values at stake when self-constraining rules are
adopted can justify the drawing of constitutional lines.
B.

Substantive Concerns about Legislative Self-Constraint

Professor Kahn correctly observes that the problem with self-constraining legislation lies in the potential limits it places on popular sovereignty, which should be "inalienable and complete," 66 unimpaired by the
actions of past Legislatures. The principle of inalienable popular sovereignty is accepted by everyone at some level of generality. The problem
is to transform the general proposition to a judgment about whether the
technique by which Gramm-Rudman constrains the future is constitutional. In the preceding pages I have argued that the existing constitutional techniques by which a majority favoring legislation can be forced
by prior legislative action to marshal additional political strength-such
as by statutes manipulating the electoral process, by clear statement, and
by procedural rules-cannot be distinguished from a statute like
Gramm-Rudman, which imposes a more direct constraint on the substantive content of future laws. I admit, however, that the ability to find
distinctions depends in large part on the importance of making them.
Popular sovereignty is too vague a principle to be self-applying. Decisions about whether a particular practice violates that principle draw on
our perceptions of its meaning and significance.
One value underlying the commitment to popular sovereignty is the
importance of keeping legislators accountable. For this reason, the process must not be rendered "opaque" to constituents.6 7 Gramm-Rudman
contributes to opaqueness by encouraging strategic moves that do not
reflect actual positions, such as by urging appropriations, and by allowing current legislators to blame the past Legislature for inaction.6 8 If
this kind of opaqueness were unconstitutional, a good deal of our legislative process would be suspect. Legislators posture all the time. They
inflate demands strategically. They also confuse constituents by voting
for an authorization bill and opposing a related appropriation, and by
voting for a procedure favoring a bill and voting against the bill in substance. But those constituents who really care are not confused. Furthermore, they would not be confused by an elected representative's
refusal to vote an exception to Gramm-Rudman, any more than they
would be confused by a refusal to vote for an appropriation bill because
66. Kahn, supra note 7, at 231.
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id. at 208-09.
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of its alleged impact on the deficit. Constituents who care will hold the
current legislator accountable for not voting the exception and for not
knowing the legislative strategy needed to obtain the desired appropriation. Gramm-Rudman creates no significant additional legislative
"opaqueness," only an obstacle to mustering a future majority.
Thus we return to the question of what our attitude should be toward such obstructions to popular sovereignty. There is one fixed point
of reference in evaluating legislative techniques for constraining future
legislation: the majority rules. It may come as a surprise to learn that
this is nowhere specified in the Constitution. It is a basic rule of parliamentary law,69 presumably incorporated into the Constitution by vesting
legislative power in Congress, 70 and suggested by negative implication
from the requirement of supramajorities in certain situations.7 1 If a statute constraining the content of future legislation is tantamount to requiring a supramajority, the law would be unconstitutional. The constraint
of a statute like Gramm-Rudman is not, however, the equivalent of a
supramajority requirement. The point of a statute like Gramm-Rudman
is to tie together two legislative issues that would not otherwise be linked
and to require a majority vote on both issues before either can pass. The
statute in effect defines a program of related legislation on which the majority must take a position, before any one part of the program can be
adopted. These linkages make the task of mustering a majority more
difficult, but are not the equivalent of saying that legislation requires a
supramajority vote. Establishing such programmatic links might even be
desirable legislation, given the pressures for ad hoc decentralized deci69. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892); Adams v. Fort Madison Community
School Dist., 182 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Iowa 1970); Morris v. Cashmore, 253 App. Div. 657, 659,
aff'd, 278 N.Y. 730 (1938); Tayloe v. Davis, 212 Ala. 282, 285, 102 So. 433, 435 (1924). See
also P. MASON'S, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE § 10 (1979).

The House of Representatives' rules also specify that the majority rules. MANUAL AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 271, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 656,
Rule XXXVIII (1982).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (two-thirds of Senate to convict after impeachment); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (two-thirds to expel); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (two-thirds to
override veto); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (two-thirds of Senate to ratify treaty); U.S.
CONsT. art. V (two-thirds to propose constitutional Amendments). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. XII (majority of all electors needed to elect the President, not just majority of those
present and voting, which is the usual parliamentary rule).
The fact that the Vice-President can break a tie (U.S. CONST. art. I., § 3, cl. 4), does not
mandate majority rule, because it does not specify that the majority must always rule. It only
states how ties are to be broken when majority rule is required.
The Constitution explicitly states that a majority is a quorum, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
1, but not that majority rules.
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72
sionmaking concerning spending
Although constraining the substance of future statutes is not the
equivalent of requiring a supramajority, the constraint still exists and its
constitutionality depends on our view of efforts to obstruct future legislative change. Our attitude is properly ambivalent. When the conflict between past and future is framed as one between tradition and change, we
tend to prefer change, because we see no particular substantive value in
tradition, at least when the Legislature would reject it. But when the
issue is the pace of change, between quicker and slower responses, the
tendency is to favor caution. The Supreme Court has expressed this
view in numerous cases involving claims that statutes unconstitutionally
obstruct political change, where the Court has shown a preference for
cautious change through a stable two-party system. For example, new
parties and new groups within the two parties must be permitted a political voice, but statutes discouraging their rise to political prominence can
take account of the potential disruptive effects of political change outside
of the two-party system; 73 a state can discourage candidates from being
sore losers within a party but must allow them reasonable access to the
ballot, if they can muster financial support;7 4 government financing of the
two major parties is permitted, while successful new parties can obtain
government aid after they have succeeded at the ballot;7 5 and multimember districts are allowed unless it can be shown that the purpose is
to exclude minority political interests,76 which has so far meant only racial minorities.77 The effect of these rules is to force political change into
the two-party mold, where change can occur by the gradual process of
intraparty compromise. Quick responsiveness of the political process to
political change can be discouraged, but long-term exclusion will not be
countenanced.
The one person, one vote requirement further evidences an ambivalent attitude towards political change, favoring a system in which the
pace of change is controlled. This requirement forces the Legislature to

72. State constitutions have long been concerned with what can be lumped together in one
statute. The one subject rule attempts to identify what issues are programmatically related,
see Ruud, supra note 65, and the prohibition of substantive law in appropriations bills applies
only when the substantive rule is not related to the spending provision. See Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 664 (Fla. 1980); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977).
73. See supra note 51.
74. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
76. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
77. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986) (blatant gerrymandering to favor the
incumbent party will be upheld unless there is a showing of persistent exclusion over time).
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look at electoral districts every ten years, when the census is taken.7 8
Within that ten year period, political change does not have to be directly
reflected in redistricting. Short-term legislative constraints are therefore
accepted but long-term constraints are discouraged by the requirement of
periodic redistricting.
Popular sovereignty therefore means that reasonably short-term
constraints on political change are permissible. Change can be slowed
down, but not completely stifled. By this standard legislative self-constraint should be tolerated for a reasonably short period of time. Selfconstraint in the manner of Gramm-Rudman would be constitutional,
because it was intended to operate only from 1986 until 1991. If budget
deficits were not lowered by then in accordance with the statutory time
table, the statute would no longer be effective, unless the self-constraining
rules were readopted.
Any lingering doubts about what popular sovereignty means should
be resolved in favor of moving cautiously when evaluating a statute like
Gramm-Rudman. Gramm-Rudman is itself an experiment in legislative
self-constraint, and we cannot know exactly what popular sovereignty
requires in this context until we have had more experience. Perhaps the
future impact of such statutes will be objectionable. Unlike clear statement rules, which force issues into the open, self-constraining law may
proliferate to stifle rather than slow down political change. Instead of
linking programmatically related statutes, completely unrelated policies
may be welded together in one statute. We may on that account want to
strike down all such statutes. The situation is reminiscent of the legislative veto. The Supreme Court's pronouncement on this issue is very formalistic:79 the legislative veto violates separation of powers. But it is
hard to overlook the fact that the veto began as an experiment in the
context of executive reorganization plans over fifty years ago. 0 Only
when the veto threatened to engulf the entire political process, evidenced
by a Senate bill which would have subjected all agency regulations to a
legislative veto," was the veto found to violate our constitutional
structure.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

79. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80. Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 212, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414. See The Legislative
Veto After Chadha, 1984: HearingsBefore the H. Rep. Comm. on Rules, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1059-60 (1984) (statement of Judge Steven Breyer, United States Court of Appeals, First
Circuit).
81. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-03, 128 CONG. REC. 2,719-21 (daily ed. March
24, 1982).
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Self-constraining statutes should be allowed time to evolve before we
conclude that direct constraints on the content of future laws is
unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Self-constraint may sometimes be as desirable in government as in
people. Formal doctrines condemning self-constraining rules fail to address directly their substantive impact or to distinguish equally effective
but permissible rules. The fundamental policy issue is adaptability to
change in the specific context of the institutional processes by which adaptation occurs, and the substantive implications of prohibiting or permitting change. When the relevant institution is the Legislature,
responsiveness to democratic change is an obvious but not self-defining
concern. At this point in time, however, we simply do not know the full
implications of allowing the Legislature to constrain its future rulemaking power. Short-term constraints, like Gramm-Rudman, seem well
within the boundaries of constitutional doctrine that allows the Legislature to slow down political change by forcing political movements into
the two-party system. Whether it will seem that way fifty years from
now is impossible to tell.

4

r

~

'7
77

